Motherhood Does Not Prevent Eligibility: Vinesh Phogat and India’s Obligation to Honour Maternity Rights in Sport

Devansh Awasthi*

Introduction

“The fact of motherhood must not be regarded as an impediment.” It was with this declaration that the High Court of Delhi placed the Indian sports administration under constitutional standards. In Vinesh Phogat v. Wrestling Federation of India & Ors. (“Vinesh Phogat“), a question arose as to whether or not an athlete returning from maternity leave would be allowed to compete in trials for the Asian Games 2026. The interim order dated May 22, 2026, passed in a Letters Patent appeal, must be weighed against no less than the merits of this case. Hereafter, Wrestling Federation of India (“WFI”) proceeded to the Supreme Court, which held on June 4, 2026, that there was no confirmation of the findings of the High Court.

However, one caveat must be addressed. It must be noted that WFI is a society and not a ‘State’ under Article 12, as has been held by the Supreme Court in respect of BCCI in Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India, (2005) 4 SCC 649. Nevertheless, it acknowledged the fact that an entity discharging public functions falls within the ambit of Article 226, which is further supported by the National Sports Governance Act, 2025 (the “NSGA”) by virtue of declaring recognised federations as “public authorities” under the Right to Information Act, 2005. Thus, the current case is much broader than just wrestling. How can federations claim to ensure merit-based selection while their policies inhibit women from exercising their reproductive rights?

The Problems Associated with the Implementation of “Neutral” Selection Practices

The selection procedures are often based on the neutral factors such as tests, scores, and performance record which is true in professional sports too. Regardless of the fact that criterion is neutral, if any neutral criterion leads to discrimination, this will breach constitutional law. While the selection window is applicable to all athletes including women athletes, the latter are more negatively affected by it since it may stop them from competing at all during the period. The most evident example is maternity.

Indirect discrimination is a principle of law made clear in the Supreme Court judgment in Lt. Col. Nitisha v. Union of India (2021) (“Nitisha”) with reference to Griggs v. Duke Power Co., Essop v. Home Office, and Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General) ("Fraser"). In Nitisha, the criterion set for female officers serving in the Short Service Commission was the same as one set for male officers but male officers had the possibility of making use of the criterion with regard to their career paths which were inaccessible for women.

Articles 14 and 15(1) 

In Nitisha, the Supreme Court used the four-prong test developed by Sandra Fredman which takes into account substantive equality and allows differentiation in order to bring about structural change. The accommodation is not merely given by the law but it is aimed at being part of the law. In Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission (2021), the Supreme Court ruled that reasonable accommodation is a component of substantive equality, while the denial of reasonable accommodation constitutes discrimination. While the particular case in Vikash Kumar concerned persons with disabilities, the principle of reasonable accommodation extends beyond disability and requires institutions to alter rules or procedures where their application would otherwise result in exclusion, as illustrated by the Court’s approach in the case concerning Vinesh Phogat. 

There are three aspects of the maternity-blind selection policy under which a challenge can be mounted under Article 14.

The first is that it turns a temporary biological condition into an indefinite disability and does not have any relation to the only matter that needs to be determined here which is the present fitness of the athlete. For instance, in Air India v. Nergesh Meerza (1981), the Court held a provision terminating the service of air hostesses upon pregnancy as unconstitutional. Thus, the selection process is carrying out the same result without expressly referring to pregnancy, and it treats a temporary biological condition as a continuing capacity, rather than assessing the present fitness of the individual. Similarly, in Hamsaanandini Nanduri v. Union of India, the Supreme Court held that a three-month period for maternity benefits granted under Section 60(4) of the Code in the year 2020 is against the principle of equality and discrimination.

The second reason is the confusion between favor and accommodation. Favoring a mother in trials is not favoritism; it is allowing the exercise of merit.

Finally, the selection process utilizes stereotypes. In Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya (2020), it was claimed by the Union in its defense that the exclusion of women officers from the Permanent Commission was justified due to physiological problems and maternal obligations. However, this was not considered as an acceptable argument before the constitutional court. The argument put forth by WFI is the equivalent of this apparent institutional fallacy because they do not contend that Phogat is incapable of wrestling; rather, they claim that the prescribed standardized guideline provides no scope for any deviation. The fact that a federation does not leave room for maternity in its own protocol is quite revealing, given that the policy was launched without consideration of the needs of women who pursue careers alongside motherhood. 

Article 21: Dignity and Reproductive Choices

Article 21 makes it relevant. Article 21 is related to the right to dignity and making reproductive choices. The judgments of Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration (2009), and K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) are a case in point in interpretation of it. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll) (2000), it was stipulated that Article 42 must be read into Article 21, translating maternity benefits into a fundamental right rather than just a welfare benefit. Therefore, a policy that imposes a cost to exercise reproductive freedom cannot be considered to be neutral; it rather constitutes a penalty for exercising that right. The situation is worse in elite sports, where careers are short and selection is totally rigorous.

Opposition to Maternity Benefits from the Fairness Perspective

The main objection to maternity benefits concerns fairness to other athletes since it creates advantages for a specific athlete when she is allowed maternity benefits, which is no longer the case for those athletes who have competed before without breaks. Yet, it is irrelevant because accommodation does not imply selection, nor does it mean that a better athlete is going to lose.

In addition, the objection misunderstands Article 15(3) under which special provisions are enacted for women because of their special needs. It demonstrates that Article 15(3) can still achieve the effects of equality instead of being considered a deviation from the rule of equal treatment as established by the Government of Andhra Pradesh v. P.B. Vijayakumar case (1995). The same thing is proven by Article 42 and Article 11(2) of CEDAW, which aim to ensure equal treatment of women.

Thus, this has a very simple effect from a practical point of view: the sports organization may demand the athlete to have medical clearance, pass trials, and provide information on current level of fitness. However, it is not acceptable to deny her participation just because the athlete has not competed earlier.

Governance Should Replace Ad Hoc Relief

The National Sports Board has been set up in accordance with Section 5 of the NSGA to be able to give, withdraw, suspend or revoke the recognition of any organization or individual. The creation of the National Sports Tribunal has been done in accordance with Section 17 of the Act, which provides for appeals to the Supreme Court under Section 25.

The matter raises the issue of an inherent flaw in the systems. Some matters do not fall under the jurisdiction of any sports tribunal, including the NST, and thus, cannot be settled through the mechanism established by national sports organizations, international federations, or at the international level through the Court of Arbitration for Sport. Hence, any matter concerning maternity selection will have to be referred back to the relevant federation, which has a questioned policy in this respect, and the private courts cannot be invoked in this case.

This is a case where administrative remedies are available without the need for any legislative process. Maternity and parental policies should be compulsory conditions for the recognition of every sports organization, so as to ensure that the female athletes are protected in returning to the competitive sport after childbirth, pregnancy, miscarriage, stillbirth, adoption, or surrogacy. In the absence of such measures, the promise of equality in the field of sport would rest on the willingness and ability of individual athletes to approach the courts to enforce rights that should instead be secured through institutional policy. 

Comparative Observations

India does not have to start from scratch on this route. Fraser provides a precedent in which the members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police suffered a withdrawal of pension benefits on account of their working together to maintain their families. The Supreme Court of Canada held that this practice was discriminatory and in violation of Canadian law.

Thus, the required principle already exists in law in India, and there is consequently a basis for implementing it through national sports bodies. Bodies such as the Australian Institute of Sport, for instance, have already established policies recognising the compatibility between motherhood and participation in sport, demonstrating that accommodating motherhood need not come at the cost of merit in sport. 

Final Thoughts

The interim decision of the High Court cannot be regarded as final and it should be thus guided by the principles established in the previous decisions. This has been demonstrated previously in cases like Nergesh Meerza, wherein the Supreme Court held that no employee can be denied work on the ground of her pregnancy, and in the case of Babita Puniya, where exclusion was based on stereotypes of a woman's biological qualities. Thus the required point has now been settled, and what remains will be the waiting period.

*Devansh Awasthi is a B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) student at Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow.

The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Pith & Substance: The CCAL Blog.