Does The Indian Constitution Care? Plugging In Constitutional Silences On The Ethics Of Care Through Fundamental Rights

Jwalika Balaji and Anshul Dalmia contend that the Indian Constitution’s silence on care is a consequential doctrinal gap that leaves vulnerable populations without meaningful constitutional recourse. Drawing on feminist scholars including Gilligan, Noddings, Tronto, and Fredman, the authors argue that while Indian courts have invoked care across domains such as health, childcare, and household labour, they have done so derivatively by tethering care to Article 21 rather than recognising it as an autonomous constitutional value. Since Directive Principles remain explicitly nonjusticiable, simply labelling care a value would be insufficient. Using South Africa as a comparator and the right to education as a domestic precedent, the authors propose two reform pathways: judicial anchoring of care within Article 21, or a standalone constitutional amendment inserting care into Part III. They conclude that elevating care to a fundamental right is essential for India to move from formal to substantive equality.

CALJ Special Issue_Balaji_Dalmia.pdf

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