Deparadoxing Constitutional Democracy

Prof. (Dr.) Laurence Claus revisits Socrates’ observations that democracy can undermine itself when popular authority becomes concentrated in the hands of a singular leader. The article argues that while the British parliamentary and American presidential systems achieved durability through long formative periods marked by elitist constraints, the involvement of mass suffrage from the start has rendered the system vulnerable. The author suggests that charismatic leaders are uniquely able to convert temporary popularity into disciplined party control, enabling them to dominate legislatures and, at times, alter constitutional frameworks to entrench their power. Drawing on comparative experience, the article contends that this paradox is not insoluble. It examines case studies from early British and American constitutional development to demonstrate how institutional dispersal of authority prevented total executive capture. It then turns to the Swiss system, where proportional representation and a plural executive provide structural safeguards against the rise of singular leaders. The article concludes that contemporary constitutional democracies can remain both fully inclusive and institutionally resilient by perfecting models of power sharing that resist the temptations of charismatic authority.

CALJ Volume IX Issue II_Claus.pdf

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