The Conundrum of Manifest Arbitrariness and Legislature’s Intent: An Inquiry

Anubhav Kumar & Neha Tripathi examine the evolution of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution from the reasonable classification test to the doctrine of arbitrariness. They trace its origins in Justice Bhagwati’s opinion in E.P. Royappa, where arbitrariness was positioned as antithetical to equality, and analyse Justice Nariman’s decision in Shayara Bano, which extended the concept of “manifest arbitrariness” to strike down plenary legislation. The article critiques this judicial innovation on both conceptual and institutional grounds. By equating arbitrariness with inequality, the authors argue, courts risk conflating administrative law standards with constitutional adjudication. This creates uncertainty about whether arbitrariness constitutes a standalone test or a variant of reasonable classification. More significantly, the doctrine allows courts to enquire into legislative intent, a move that unsettles the presumption of constitutionality and blurs the line between legislative policy and judicial review. Through a detailed engagement with precedents ranging from Royappa and Ajay Hasia to McDowell, Navtej Johar, and the Electoral Bonds judgment, the article highlights inconsistencies in the Supreme Court’s reasoning. The authors contend that the use of manifest arbitrariness risks fostering excessive judicial intervention and undermining the principle of separation of powers. It concludes that while Article 14 must remain a robust safeguard against discriminatory state action, the doctrine of manifest arbitrariness is constitutionally unsustainable, normatively undefined, and vulnerable to judicial overreach. The authors caution that the continued use of this doctrine could lead to “juristocracy,” and argue instead for a restrained and textually grounded approach to legislative review under Article 14.

CALJ Volume IX Issue 2 Kumar Tripathi.pdf

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